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THE COLOR LINE OF PUNISHMENT
Jerome H. Skolnick*
RAcE, CRIME, AND THE LAW. By Randall Kennedy. New York:
Pantheon Books. 1997. Pp. 538. $30.

If "the color line," (in W.E.B. Du Bois's 1903 phrase and proph
ecy)1 was to be the twentieth century's greatest challenge for the
domestic life and public policy of the United States, the law has had
much to do with drawing its shape. No surprise, this. By now, legal
theorists accept that law does not advance in preordained fashion,
immune from the sway of political interest, belief systems and social
structure. Still, it is hard to exaggerate how powerfully the law has
shaped the life chances of Americans of African heritage, for good
or ill, and in ways that we scarcely think of today.
The act of interracial marrying, for example, does not today
evoke visions of criminality, although it once did. Thirty-nine states
- including states in the North and West - had at one time passed
laws forbidding intermarriage between persons of different race.2
Many of these laws were still in effect following World War II.3 If a
black man had married a white woman in Virginia in 1966 the mar
riage would have been void ab initio, and they would each have
been guilty of a felony. Loving v. Virginia, 4 the 1967 case that freed
interracial couples to marry, is only a footnote in Randall Ken
nedy's Race, Crime and the Law, but that is understandable.
The anti-miscegenation laws arose out of racial theories assert
ing that the children of "mixed" marriages would be defective. In
one respect, these laws were often breached in practice. Black
women were taken or raped regularly by white men who were
rarely, if ever, punished (p. 35). Such children were sired in un
counted numbers, and then denoted as "Negro." The laws
criminalizing intermarriage thus delegitimatized the offspring of re
lations between white men and black women so that they could not
* Claire Clements Dean's Professor Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley.
B.B.A. 1952, City College of New York; M.A. 1953, Ph.D. 1957, Yale. - Ed. A version of
this book review also appears in THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, July-Aug. 1998, at 90-95.
1. W.E.B. Du Bors, THE Sour.s OF BLACK FOLK 35 (Frrst Vrntage Books 1990) (1903).
2. See FOWLER V. HARPER & JEROME H. SKOLNICK, PROBLEMS OF 11lE FAMILY 96-99
(rev. ed. 1962).
3. For example, California's law forbidding most interracial marriage was in effect until
1948, when it was invalidated by the Supreme Court of California. See Perez v. Lippold, 198
P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
4. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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inherit their father's property. In another respect, the laws were
rigorously enforced to prevent black men from having consensual
sex with white women under any circumstances, including marriage.
These laws implied that no rational, adult, white woman would
agree to have sex with a black man. Any breaking of the sex-color
line taboo between a black man and a white woman could be and in the peculiar logic of the deep South should be - considered
the moral equivalent of rape, even if blessed by the sacrament of
marriage.
In the context of such racial theorizing, accusations of rape
against black men made by white women were rarely disbelieved.
Stich accusations were likely to draw the unbridled viciousness of
white vigilantes, who remained unpunished for the crimes they
committed while carrying out lynchings - which often included
whipping, torturing, burning, and eventu�y hanging the victim the "strange fruit" of Lillian Smith's acclaimed novel.5 Southern
court records show that when a black man was accused of murder
ing a white man, he was usually not lynched, but was given a trial
and, if found guilty, capitally punished.6 The accusation of rape, by
contrast, was more likely to evoke the hot-blooded savagery of a
lynching.
The institutions of southern justice - police and courts - typi
cally ignored the crimes committed by those participating in the
lynching. Southern blacks passed around stories, which became
legends, about sex, terror, and the meaninglessness of the official
legal order. Lynching maintained the caste superiority of whites
and the bloody etiquette of cross-racial sex, and it undermined any
trust Americans of African descent might have had in the legal or
der. "Nothing has more nourished dreams of racial revenge," Ran
dall Kennedy, a former law clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall and
a Professor at Harvard Law School, writes, "than the knowledge
that buried in American history are scores of black victims of lynch
ing whose murderers, though known, escaped punishment" (p. 49).
No RAcE-BAsEo LAw ENFORCEMENT
This ignominious history of legal theory and practice is a neces
sary preamble to any understanding of race and crime in America
today. For this reason, one has to wonder whether America is now
ready for the message throughout Randall Kennedy's recent book
Race, Crime, and the Law
that in enforcing the criminal laws, the
courts and the police should never base their judgments and actions
on race.
-

5. LILLIAN SMITH, STRANGE FRUIT (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1992) (1944).
6. See E.M. Beck et al., The Gallows, the Mob, and the Vote: Lethal Sanctioning ofBlacks
in Nonh Carolina and Georgia, 1882 to 1930, 23 L. & SoCY. REv. 317, 329 (1989).
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Kennedy's position is scarcely that of a reflexive radical on the
complex and polarizing issue of contemporary race and crime. He
discusses and deplores how African Americans are doubly victim
ized by crime and argues that "the principal injury suffered by Afri
can Americans in relation to criminal matters is not
overenforcement but underenforcement of the laws."7 Randall
Kennedy, like Jesse Jackson, recognizes that disproportionate black
criminality leads to understandable fears among potential victims,
whether black or white. And like his mentor, Justice Marshall, he
does not excuse "thuggery" when perpetrated by blacks. Ken
nedy's fair-mindedness concerning race and crime is further illus
trated when, in discussing the now-mythic beating of Rodney King,
a black victim of white police, Kennedy points out that the case was
· more complicated than is generally acknowledged by those familiar
only with the portion of the videotape shown on television. At the
Simi Valley trial, defense attorneys focussed the jury's attention on
King's behavior leading to the beating. He was, after all, drunk,
driving at high speed, and resisting arrest. Some use of escalated
force was probably justified against him, although not the fifty-six
powerful blows that were actually inflicted. At the Simi Valley trial,
Kennedy reminds us, defense attorneys were able to point to sub
tleties that clouded the issue of whether the police harbored racist
intent.
Kennedy unfolds his thesis - that the courts and the police
should never base their judgments and actions on race - in discus
sions of five major issues: (1) the use of race as an indicator of
suspiciousness; (2) the use of race-based peremptory challenges; (3)
7. P. 19. Homicide victimization rates for black males and females continue to be higher
than for other segments of the population. Black males were 8 to 9 times more likely than
white males to have committed a homicide during 1996; most of these homicides were in·
traracial. In 1996, about 9 out of every 10 murders involved victims and offenders of the
same race when the race of the offender was known. See James Alan Fox, Trends in Juvenile
Violence: 1997 Update (November 1997) (available at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ab·
stract/tjrfox.htm>. Thus, as overall crime rates decline, so does crime committed by and
against blacks.
Overall, violent crime dropped in 1996 in the United States to levels not seen since 1973.
BUREAU OF JusnCE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Criminal Victimization, 1996:
Changes 1995-96 With Trends, available at <http://www.ojp.usdoj-gov/bjs/abstract/cv1996.
htm>. New York City's remarkable crime decline has received the most publicity, and de·
servedly so. In 1990, New York City experienced 2,245 homicides. That figure dropped re·
markably in 1996 to 983 homicides. The year 1997 saw yet another drop to 770. In the first
three months of 1997, 281 homicides occurred. In the first three months of 1998, only 141
homicides have been reported. Interview with Michael Farrell, Deputy Commissioner for
Policy and Planning, New York City Police Department (April 2, 1998). In fact, crime is
dropping all over the United States, from Los Angeles to Cleveland, to Boston, even to
Washington, D.C. The F.B.I. reported that the homicide rate fell 9 percent in 1996. Federal
Bureau of lnvestigation Press Release, October 4, 1997. As crime declines generally, so does
the level of black criminality. This may help to undermine fears of crime committed by
young black males, who are responsible for most of the crime by blacks.
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the death penalty; (4) race-based jury nullification; and (5) race
based disparity in punishment.

THE PROPRIETY OF RACE

As

AN

INDICATION OF SUSPICIOUSNESS

Kennedy devotes a significant portion of his book to a related
issue, but one more subtle than police brutality. "By too easily per
mitting the police to use race as an indicia of suspiciousness," he
writes, "courts also derogate from the idea that individuals should
be judged on the basis of their own, particular c_onduct and not on
the basis - not even partly on the basis ....:..:. of raCial generaliza
tions" (p. 157). He asserts that it is never appropriate for police to
use color as a proxy for criminality. Kennedy does, however, distin
guish between cases where police act on the basis of a detailed de
scription as opposed to "the use of racial categories as a
probabilistic sorting device . . . to demarcate groups of persons who,
because of their race, are viewed as more risky than other persons"
(p. 137 n.*).
He recognizes that race can signal heightened criminality, just as
it can indicate other "sociological facts," for instance, greater risk of
early mortality, fewer employment opportunities, lower income and
substandard housing. But such "sociological facts" do not, he says,
"mean that the legal system ought to permit police to engage rou
tinely in racial discrimination" (p. 145).
Kennedy points to a number of state and federal cases where
courts have permitted police to stop and question someone who is
"out of place": in a white neighborhood, as part of a drug courier
profile, or in border checkpoints to subject the driver to questioning
or search.8 Kennedy deplores the legal doctrines permitting police
to equate blackness with increased risk of criminality because of the
distrust, anger and discord they generate.
What are the probabilities of black violence? "It is beyond fool
ishness to regard American violence as solely, or mainly, or even
distinctively a black problem," write Franklin Zimring and Gordon
Hawkins.9 In part, they say, this is because American blacks tend
to reside in places where social conditions precipitate the greatest
violence by all races and partly because tendencies to lethal vio
lence seem to be endemic to the United States.10 Nevertheless, in
statistics generated by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in connection
8. See State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1975); United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d
391 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1040 (1992); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 563-64 (1976).
9. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GoRDON HAWKINS, CRIME 1s NoT THE PROBLEM 79 (1997).
10. See id.
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with the President's Initiative on Race11 we find that crime is dis
proportionately a black problem. Although most victims of violent
crime are white (seventy-five percent in 1995), blacks are victimized
at higher rates than whites. Blacks have higher arrest rates for vio
lent crime than other segments of the population, although most
persons (fifty-four percent) arrested for violent crime in 1995 were
white. Moreover, despite recent declines, both homicide victimiza
tion and commission rates continue to be higher for blacks than for
other segments of the population. At each age, black males are
about.eight to nine times more likely than white males to have com
mitted a homicide during 1996.12

If that is so, it raises a troublesome question: Is it necessarily
wrong for police to be color conscious? We rely on police to be
sensitive to subtle cues in their visual world. In my observations of
police in the early 1960's, I developed the concept of the "symbolic
assailant," that is, "persons who use gesture, language, and attire
that the policeman has come to recognize as a prelude to vio
lence."13 More generally, police who are patrolling an area are sup
posed to develop a conception of the normal. They are supposed to
understand who belongs there and which buildings generally have
lights on in the darkest hours of the early morning. They are sup
posed to notice an older man parked in front of an elementary
school. Is he a grandfather picking up a grandchild or a sexual
predator? Kennedy would argue that such observations are legiti
mate. But suppose a police officer sees two black teenagers walk
ing in a white neighborhood at two o'clock in the morning? In a
society where the residential color line has so often been drawn,
should we ask police to ignore the race of the teenagers? And if we
did, would they?
Even if courts were to forbid police from noticing race, can
courts actually affect police conduct in this delicate area? Will po
lice simply not list race when it actually was a factor in stopping and
questioning someone who fits a profile or appears suspicious to the
police even if legal doctrine says they may not? Consider the fol
lowing case. A police detective sees two men, Chilton and Terry,
"casing" a jewelry store. Lawyers familiar with the landmark 1968
case of Terry v. Ohio14 know the rest of the story. The officer ques
tions the men, decides that a crime is afoot, proceeds to pat them
down, discovers guns and arrests them, along with a third man.
11. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, "Question and Answer" document
specially prepared for the President's Initiative on Race (November 17, 1997).
12. Id.
13. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 44 (3rd ed. Macmillan Press 1994)
(1966).
14. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Detective Martin McFadden testifies that he had been patrolling in
plainclothes at two-thirty in the afternoon, in an area of downtown
Cleveland that he had been patrolling for thirty years. He says he
saw something odd about these men. "Now, in this case when I
looked over they didn't look right to me at the time."15
The Warren court, while understanding that McFadden had less
than probable cause to conduct his search, deferred to the practical
needs of policing and permitted the limited pat-down search of
Chilton and Terry and the seizure of their weapons, a major doctri
nal shift in the law governing when police can lawfully stop and
frisk suspects. Not mentioned in the Supreme Court decision is that
the suspects were in fact black teenagers, as the N.A.A.C.P. Legal
Defense Fund brief16 pointed out at the time. But was McFadden
necessarily a racist? After all, Terry and Chilton were behaving sus
piciously, they turned out to be armed and evidently were about to
commit a crime. Yet is it credible that McFadden took no notice of
their skin color but simply their behavior as part of what made
them not "look right" to him at the time? More troubling, is it
possible for a police officer not to factor skin color into his or her
perceptions of not "looking right" in a society where skin color is so
salient?
These are unsettling questions, especially for those like Ken
nedy - and me - who would prefer to erase skin color as a legiti
mate indicator of anything. As normative aspirations go,
Kennedy's desire to eliminate race as an indicator of suspiciousness
is commendable. It is a standard to which we and the courts should
aspire. But I expect that in the real world of social and color strati
fication, disproportionate black criminality, and racism, it is inevita
ble that police will continue to use race as an indicator, as
McFadden must surely have done. And like McFadden, especially
if courts say that police cannot use race as an indicator, they won't
report that they did, and will testify that what they saw was solely
odd behavior.

RACE AND

THE

JURY

Kennedy's insistence that skin color be irrelevant in the process
ing of those accused of crime extends as well to jury selection. Not
until 1986 did the Supreme Court hold that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to
exclude blacks from juries. Since then it has outlawed racially
based peremptory challenges for the defense as well.17 Judges can
15. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
16. Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Nos. 63, 74, & 67).
17. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
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exercise more authority over attorneys in a courtroom than they
can over police on the street. Kennedy is skeptical that courts can
actually prevent prosecutors or defense attorneys from using per
emptory challenges to shape the racial composition of the jury.
Like Justice Marshall, he favors eliminating these challenges alto
gether, arguing that it is probably the only way to restrain attorneys
who use race as a criterion in jury selection (p. 229).
THE DEATH PENALTY

Other components of the criminal justice system are more ame
nable to doctrinal authority. The Supreme Court could, if it chose,
abolish the death penalty, but the present conservative court is not
about to do so. Kennedy is masterful in describing the doctrinal
zigs and zags of death penalty jurisprudence, and offers an espe
cially careful and knowledgeable analysis of the statistical data on
race and execution.
In the most recent major Supreme Court case, McCleskey v.
Kemp, 18 the defense introduced a study showing that when victims
were white in Georgia, perpetrators were four times more likely to
be condemned to death than when victims were black. The Court
conceded that the system was skewed against blacks who murdered
whites, and against black victims, but held that the question was
whether officials had discriminated against McCleskey in this case,
not systemically. The Court ruled that they had not. As Kennedy
recognizes, it would be a gruesome kind of affirmative action that
sought to reduce racial discrepancies in capital punishment by "lev
eling up" and executing more blacks who murder black victims (p.
344).
Kennedy's discussion of racial fairness in the administration of
the death penalty is careful, knowledgeable and nuanced, but his
own position on the larger question - support or opposition to the
death penalty - is relegated to a footnote (p. 345 n. *). I thought
this a mistake, since what he says makes much sense, and deserves
the kind of careful elaboration he gives to the question of racial
fairness. Kennedy doesn't regard capital punishment as "unconsti
tutional per se;" but opposes it partly because he fears mistakes and
partly because he deplores "the lethal, collective, bureaucratic an
ger that the state displays when it puts a person to death" (p. 345).
But something else is hinted at in the footnote, a change of
heart from fervent abolitionist to mild opponent. Kennedy writes
that when he clerked for Justice Marshall he was forced into
"[c]onstantly reading about the horrible crimes perpetrated by mur
derers sentenced to death" (p. 345). Evidently, the brutality of the
18. 481 U.S. 279 {1987).
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murderers and the pain of the victims cooled his abolitionist fervor.
It is not easy to develop a purely rational position on capital punish
ment, although Justice Blackmun's argument - that the death pen
alty cannot be administered fairly - comes closest.
JURY NULLIFICATION
Punishment is altogether a difficult issue, especially when one
can predict that a particular race or class will be disproportionately
represented in the punishment apparatus. Some African-American
legal scholars, notably Paul Butler in the Yale . Law Journal, have
advocated that black jurors nullify the eVidence in cases where the
black defendants are charged with what he describes as "nonvio
lent, malum prohibitum offenses, including victimless crimes like
narcotics offenses."19
Kennedy will have none of this. Agreeing that African Ameri
cans have often been treated unjustly in the system of criminal jus
tice, he rebuts Butler point by point, arguing that Butler bases his
position on a one-dimensional vision. Yes, Kennedy acknowledges,
the prosecution of the Scottsboro boys20 was "horrible, [and] ra
cially motivated," but both state and federal authorities intervened
"in an extraordinary fashion" ultimately preventing their execution
(p. 300). Similarly, Rodney King's victimization was later followed
by the imprisonment of the perpetrators of the brutality after a fed
eral civil rights prosecution. That aside, Kennedy avers, jury nullifi
catjon will scarcely advance the cause of broad social reform that
Butler advocates. Those who engage in nullification will have to
say that they ignored the evidence for a larger cause, and few jurors
are willing to do that. The jurors in the O.J. Simpson case, for ex
ample, did not admit to nullification of the evidence although one
of the black members of the jury reportedly stated after the verdict,
"We've got to protect our own" (p. 310 n.t).
D RUG PENALTIES

Nevertheless, major scholars have argued that the criminal jus
tice system, particularly the Draconian sentences given to black
drug offenders, are needlessly and unfairly harsh.21 Part of the dif
ficulty may arise from our lack of a traditional moral sense about
the dangers of drug use and sale. We commonly share an aversion
to murder, armed robbery and burglary, and regard these as serious
19. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 715 (1995); p. 296 (quoting Butler).
20. See Weems v. Alabama, 141 So. 215 (Ala. 1932) for the Scottsboro Boys' appeal to the
Alabama Supreme Court for their rape conviction. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932),
the Supreme Court held that the defendants had been denied effective assistance of counsel.
21. See MICHAEL ToNRY, MALIGN NEGLECT 188-90 (1995).
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crimes deserving punishment. Moreover, one doesn't have to be a
law professor steeped in penal codes to understand - and approve
- that intentional murder deserves the highest punishment the law
can inflict, with armed robbery and burglary following in an ordinal
sequence.
Our intuitions with respect to drug penalties are much less clear.
What is the just desert for selling a few marihuana cigarettes? How
about five or five hundred grams of cocaine? Should sale of crack
be penalized differentially? Criminologists, including yours truly,
have written and testified against the mammoth penalties for sale
and use of drugs spurred by the war on drugs, and especially against
its Draconian consequences for black youth who sell small amounts
on the street.22
The most extreme example of a law discriminating against Afri
can-American males is the federal law which penalizes those who
sell 500 grams of cocaine powder, an amount larger than what most
street dealers possess, with a minimum of five years imprisonment.
Yet a person selling five grams of crack cocaine, a relatively trifling
amount, is also subject to a five-year minimum penalty.23 The color
line is drawn sharply here. In 1993, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
issued a report showing that the average sentence served by black
prisoners in Federal prison (seventy-one months) was forty-one
percent longer than the average served by whites (fifty months),
while in the early 1980s the average time served by blacks was com
parable to that of whites.24 Th.is did not happen because federal
judges had turned into racists. The overriding reason was the 100:1
rule in the federal sentencing statute enacted by Congress in 1986,
along with stiffer mandatory minimums for violent and gun
crimes.25
Th.is is not to say there is no difference between crack and pow
der cocaine; crack cocaine is powder cocaine dissolved in water,
with baking soda added, then heated, then dried into hard, smoka
ble pellets. In effect, if someone has cocaine, with little knowledge
or effort they can easily create crack. Street samples of crack, for
example, range from ten percent to forty percent cocaine by weight.
Although cocaine and crack are not identical, they are not so differ
ent pharmacologically as to justify vast differences in punishment.
So the structure of the current guidelines is equivalent, if eggs were
22. No one has been more critical or effective than Michael Tonry. See id.
23. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 2Dl.1 (1995) (discussing the 100:1
rule).
24. DouGLAs C. McDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, U.S. DEPT. OF Jus11CE, SEN
TENCING IN THE FEDERAL CouRTS: DoES RACE MA'ITER? 38, 42 tbl.3.4 (1993).
25. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 § 6371
(1988).
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Two other big differences distinguish powder from crack co
caine. Powder cocaine is more likely to be sold in larger, more ex
pensive amounts behind tightly closed doors. It is consequently
harder to catch those who sell it than those who sell crack, sold
mostly in crack houses or apartments known to neighbors and the
police, or in the streets. Powder cocaine is the drug of the affluent,
while crack is the drug of the poor. And because it is sold more
openly, it is more threatening to community safety and cohesion. It
is this feature of crack that has led many African-American politi
cians, and Randall Kennedy, to be more sympathetic to the distinc
tion in penalties. "Surely," Kennedy writes, "it would be just and
sensible for a government to punish more severely a person know
ingly distributing a poison in a low-priced (say five-dollar)
container as opposed to a high-priced (say fifty-dollar) container
even if the poison in the two containers was otherwise identical" (p.

383).
But John P. Morgan and Lynne Zimmer, who carefully ex
amined the evidence on the supposedly different effects of crack
and powder cocaine, conclude that data from the National Institute
of Drug Abuse show "that relatively few cocaine users actually be
come 'dependent' - whatever their route of administration - but
that smoking cocaine by itself does not increase markedly the likeli
hood of dependence."26 They recognize that smoking cocaine pro
duces a shorter and more intense high than nasal insufflation of
cocaine in powder form. They argue further that crack has been
made available to those parts of the population who are most vul
nerable to the abuse of drugs.
But why should we legislate more severe punishment for per
sons selling the five-dollar containers to low-income street buyers if
we learned that the sellers were themselves young, black, and poor,
while the more affluent fifty-dollar sellers could afford to deal be
hind closed doors where they can cut up the powder into five-dollar
containers to be sold to the street sellers? Why should we punish
retailers more than wholesalers? After all, we demand capital pun
ishment for large-scale cocaine traffickers. Moreover, one could ar
gue, as Tonry does, that "the architects of the War on Drugs should
be held morally accountable for the havoc they have wrought
among disadvantaged members of minority groups. "27
26. John P. Morgan & Lynne Zimmer, The Social Pharmacology of Smokable Cocaine, in
CRACK IN AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND SocIAL JUSTICE 144 (Craig Reinennan & Harry
G. Levine eds., 1997).
27. ToNRY, supra note 21, at 104.

1484

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1474

At the conclusion of the book, in the very last paragraph, Ken
nedy backs off. He says he doesn't endorse the crack-powder dif
ferential. "Even if these policies are misguided," he concludes,
"being mistaken is different from being racist, and the difference is
one that greatly matters" (p. 386). Does Kennedy mean to suggest
that we should censure only the explicit attention to race in law
enforcement, but excuse disparate and punitive impacts so long as
they result from good intentions? In other contexts, he finds that
disparity in sentencing is an important measure of racism.28
CONCLUSION

Race, Crime and the Law is a work of high legal scholarship and
a cry for constitutional justice. But for me, Kennedy's key chapter
is "Race, Law, and Suspicion" where he deplores a judicial trend
that he says threatens to tum legally and morally wrong police con
duct into something that is acceptable. As a matter of principle, I
agree with Kennedy, but believe that he underestimates the capac
ity of police to work around legal doctrine; especially where police
are in the position of justifying their conduct in a procedural setting.
More importantly, I have trouble reconciling Kennedy's powerful
censure of the use of race in articulating suspicion of crime with his
wishy-washy defense of the crack and powder cocaine distinction in
Federal sentencing. In the real world of criminal law, of police, and
of the courts, enforcement and sentencing policies around drugs
loom far more significantly in the lives of young Hispanic and Afri
can-American males than the doctrine Kennedy properly criticizes.
Kennedy might well argue that the disparity of punishment for
rape, for example, is clearly footprinted in a history of racism, while
the crack-powder sentencing disparity was not grounded in racial
motives. That may be true. But in a society with a history of slav
ery and racial discrimination and with disproportionate criminality
according to race and color that is likely traceable to that history,
can we ignore disparate racial impacts when we are considering
fairness? Perhaps someday, when equality is more of a reality.
But, at present, race remains such a conspicuous factor in crime and
crime policy that we cannot fail to notice sharp differences in the
28. In a Vrrginia case discussed by Kennedy, Hampton v. Commonwealth, 58 S.E.2d 288
(Va. 1950), the defendant's attorneys showed that between 1908 and 1949, 45 black men, but
not a single white man, had been put to death for rape. P. 312. In Coker v. Georgia, the
Supreme Court prohibited imposing the death penalty for rape on grounds that the punish
ment was disproportionate to the crime. The death penalty, it held, is so "excessive" for rape
that it violates the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibition.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Kennedy notes, however, that racial disparity in rape
sentencing still exists in many places, strongly suggesting that disparity is an important mea
sure of racism. Pp. 72-74.
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fate of blacks and whites. As we approach the millennium, the
color line of punishment - especially in the war on drugs - is all
too evident.

